المعاملات مع الأطراف ذات العلاقة وإدارة الأرباح في ظل البيئات التنظيمية المختلفة في المملكة المتحدة بين السوق الرئيسية وسوق الاستثمار البديل.

Beyond the recent research on related party transactions (RPTs), we study the impact of regulatory environment on RPTs and earnings management. Using a sample of United Kingdom (UK) public firms listed on the lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the heavily regulated Main Market (Main) of the London Stock Exchange, we find evidence that firms on the Main Market use more efficient and less opportunistic RPTs than those in the AIM market. In addition, efficient RPTs are used as a substitute for the costly real earnings management in the Main Market. Our findings support the efficient contracting hypothesis under the stricter regulation of the Main Market which reduces information asymmetry and enhances internal resource optimization. Our results are robust controlling for endogeneity and selection bias problems.